EECS3342 System Specification and Refinement

Lecture Notes

Fall 2025

Jackie Wang

Lecture 1 - Sep. 4 **Syllabus**

CLO1 Document requirements organizing them into appropriate categories such as environmental constraints versus functional properties (safety and progress).

CLO2 Construct high level, abstract mathematical models of a system (consisting of both the system and its environment) amenable to formal reasoning.

CLO3 Apply set theory and predicate logic to express functional and safety properties from the requirements as events, guards, system variants and invariants of a state-event model.

CLO4 Use models to reason about and predict their safety and progress properties.

CLO5 Plan and construct a sequence of refinements from abstract high-level specifications to implemented code.

CLO6 Prove that a concrete system refines an abstract model.

CLO7 Apply the method to a variety of systems such as sequential, concurrent and embedded systems.

CLO8 Use practical tools for constructing and reasoning about the models.

CLO9 Use Hoare Logic and Dijkstra weakest precondition calculus to derive correct designs.

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Lecture 1 - Sep. 9

Syllabus & Introduction

Formal Methods:
Theorem Proving vs. Model Checking

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Lecture 3 - Sep. 11

Math Review


Propositions: Commutativity vs. SCE Implications: Contracts, Theorems Predicates: Universal vs. Existential Q.


Announcements/Reminders


- First Class (Syllabus) recording & notes posted
- Today's class: notes template posted
- Event-B Summary Document


 Priorities:

 | The print way allowed?
- - +Lab1 → Due: Next Tuesday (Sep 16)
 - + Lab2 → Due: Tuesday (Sep 23)
- Missed Lecture 2 (Tuesday):
 - + We'll dive directly into Math Review (1b).
 - + Introduction (1a) will come after the review is done.










Implication ≈ Whether a Contract is Honoured Talse proposition

$$7g \Rightarrow 7P$$

$$P \Rightarrow \varphi = 7q \Rightarrow 7P$$

Host General $\exists \chi \cdot Q(\chi)$ Tool of spec. & proofs (p.g. Rodin) $\forall \tau \cdot R(\tau) \Rightarrow P(\tau)$ Ji. R(T) 1 PCT)

syntax Predicate Logic: Quantifiers base cases in programming O. What happens Chinesal - Cation there's at least one oxictential pration disclosure)




Lecture 4 - Sep 16

Math Review

Implication: Alternative Exp. in English Logical Quantifiers: Proof Strategies Sets: Enumerations vs. Comprehension

Announcements/Reminders

- Today's class: notes template posted
- Event-B Summary Document
- Priorities:
 - +Lab1 → Due: This Tuesday (Sep 16)
 - + Lab2 → Due: Next Tuesday (Sep 23)



set of integers $-\infty, \dots, -1, 0, 7, \dots, +\infty$ set of natural numbers

0, 7, 2, ..., to 7, 2, ..., + to (postfale integers).

Ombractions of (2,71)

Logical Quantifiers: Examples

$$\forall i \bullet i \in \mathbb{N} \Rightarrow i \geq 0$$

$$\downarrow i \bullet i \in \mathbb{Z} \Rightarrow i \geq 0$$

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Logical Quantifiers: Examples

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How to prove \(\tag{\text{i.s.}} \) \(\text{P(T)} \) \(\text{Time.} \) How to prove ∃ i • R(i) ∧ P(i)? Goal: show R(z) & P(z) = Tone. (1) gre a witness that Goal: show R(z) = P(z) = False. (1) gre a witness that P. How to disprove \forall i \bullet R(i) \Rightarrow P(i) ? (1) gre a witness j s.t. R(j) but 7P(j). How to disprove I i • R(i) A P(i)? (1) show TR(I): faxe A P = fake Rein 2 set R Goal: show R(I) 1 P(I) = False- (2)

Prove/Disprove Logical Quantifications

• (Prove) or disprove: $\forall x \bullet (x \in \mathbb{Z} \land 1 \le x \le 10) \Rightarrow x > 0$.

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& WITARSS

• Prove or disprove: $\forall x \bullet (x \in \mathbb{Z} \land 1 \le x \le 10) \Rightarrow x > 1$.

Y Exems

Prove or disprove: $\exists x \bullet (x \in \mathbb{Z} \land 1 \le x \le 10) \land x > 1$.

I Prospore using withes X=1 & X=1.10

• Prove or disprove that $\exists x \bullet (x \in \mathbb{Z} \land 1 \le x \le 10) \land x > 10$?

Exercise

wong state ments of 3 Africal with natures,

 $\mathbb{D}\left\{\frac{\chi}{|0\leqslant\chi\leqslant2\right\}}$ Sets: Definitions and Membership No ordering: $\frac{1}{3}$, $\frac{1}{3}$, $\frac{1}{3}$, $\frac{1}{3}$ = $\frac{1}{3}$ (Z,3), 15 x 5 2x 4 a. How many sets of size 3 can you make

Relating Sets 12) SIC SZN (3x 745) Lecture 5 - Sep 18


Math Review

Converting ∀ and ∃ : Equational Proofs
Understanding the Choose Operator
Power Sets

Announcements/Reminders

- To nece class

 1 of No. W. • Today's class: notes template posted
- Event-B Summary Document
- Priorities:
 - + Lab 1 → Due: This Tuesday (Sep 16)
 - + Lab2 → Due: Next Tuesday (Sep 23)
- To be released:
 - + ProgTest guide
 - + 2 Practice Tests
 - + Lab1 solution



Logical Quantifications: Conversions R(x): $x \in 3342$ _class Axiom: $\forall x \cdot \beta(x) \Leftrightarrow \neg \exists x \cdot \neg Q(x)$ $(\forall X \cdot R(X) \Rightarrow P(X)) \Leftrightarrow \neg (\exists X \cdot R \land \neg P)$ P(x): x receives A+ $(\Rightarrow \{ \forall x \cdot R(x) \Rightarrow P(x) \\ (\Rightarrow \{ \forall x \cdot Q(x) \Leftrightarrow \neg \exists x \cdot \neg Q(x) \}$ ⇒ { P ⇒ R = TPVQ } 73x.7(7R(x) v P(x)) $\bigcirc \exists x \cdot \bigcirc (R(x) \Rightarrow R(x))$ <>> € ¬(Pvq) = ¬Pл¬q3 $(\exists X \bullet R \land P) \Leftrightarrow \neg(\forall X \bullet R \Rightarrow \neg P) \neg \exists_{X} \bullet \neg(Rx) \land \neg(Rx)$ (=) { -1(-1p) = p3 Exercise. 73x. R(x) 1782

<u>De Morgan</u>

 $7(m \in S) \Leftrightarrow m \notin S$ Relating Sets: Exercises $m \in S$ SI C Sz N Sz C SI (=> SI = Sz {1,23 ⊆ {1,2,33} but they're not equal S C S always fails
Ly mot-empty: \$1,23 C \$1,23 X G empty: $\phi c \phi |\phi| < |\phi| \times$ 6 C S cometines holds, sometimes fails
4 S empty -> 7 Ly S not empty -> .

Sets: Exercises

SI Sz members but not 7 (e e s)

<u>Set membership</u>: Rewrite $e \notin S$ in terms of \in and \neg

Find a common pattern for defining:

2. = (set equality) via
$$\subseteq$$
 and \supseteq

$$X = Y \Leftrightarrow X \leq Y \land Y \leq X$$

 $S_1 = S_2 \Leftrightarrow S_1 \leq S_2 \land S_2 \leq S_1$

$$S = \{1, 2, 3\}, T = \{2, 3, 1\}, U = \{3, 2\}$$
 $S = \{1, 2, 3\}, T = \{2, 3, 1\}, U = \{3, 2\}$
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Is set difference (\) commutative?

D GIMP some witness of violation.

Exercise: How many sets of size 3 can be made out of values 1, 2, 3, 4, 5? (Step 1) Make sequences (with no diphrates) of size # segmences (Step 2) Travellard ordering of equences with the same set of contents 3: For {1,3,53, we would've made sequences: (Step 3) # seq. 1 size

out of
$$N$$
 given elements,

how many ways to make a set

 $(N) = (N) = 1$
 $(N) = (N) = 1$

Power Set of
$$P(S) = \frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}$$

Set of Tuples

Given n sets S_1, S_2, \ldots, S_n , a *cross/Cartesian product* of theses sets is a set of n-tuples.

Each n-tuple $(e_1, e_2, ..., e_n)$ contains n elements, each of which a member of the corresponding set.

$$S_1 \otimes S_2 \otimes \cdots \otimes S_n = \{(e_1, e_2, \dots, e_n) \mid e_i \in S_i \land 1 \leq i \leq n\}$$

Example: Calculate {a, b} x {2, 4} x {\$, &}

$$= \{(el, ez, ez) | el \in fa, b\}$$
 $\land ez \in \{z, 4\}$ $\land ez \in \{z, 4$

Relation: set of ordered pairs

e.g. a relation on { 1, 2, 33 and { a, b3} . Is (I,a) a relation on S and T? No! "((I,a) is not a set.

Lecture 6 - Sep 23

Math Review

Constructing All Relations
Domain, Range, Inverse
Image, Restrictions, Subtractions

Announcements/Reminders

- Today's class: notes template posted
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 - + Lab1 → Review
 - +Lab2 → Due: This Tuesday (Sep 23)
- Released:
 - + ProgTest guide
 - + 2 Practice Tests
 - + Lab1 solution

Cardinality of Power Set: Interpreting Formula

- Calculate by considering subsets of various cardinalities.
- Calculate by considering whether a member should be included.

Want to know:
$$P(S)$$
 = $\frac{1}{2}$ + $\frac{1}{2}$ + $\frac{1}{2}$ + $\frac{1}{2}$ + $\frac{1}{2}$ + $\frac{1}{2}$ + $\frac{1}{2}$ | $\frac{1}{$

$$|TP(s)|$$

$$|S=\{a,b,c\}\}$$

$$|S=\{$$


Relation: Let of ordered pairs selation on S and S

- Relation: Let of ordered pairs

- T e.g. Id e.g. a relation on $\{1, 2, 3, 3\}$ and $\{a, b, 3\}$.

Is (1, a) a relation on S and T?

No! "(1, a) R not a set. . Is {(1,a)} a relation on S and T? YES . Is { (0,0)} a relation? No. order 75 word! $R_1 = \{(1, \alpha), (3, b)\}$ $R_1 = R_2$ What is the min relation on S and T? P $R_2 = \{(3, b), (1, \alpha)\}$ $R_1 = R_2$ What is the max relation on S and T? $S \times T$



* { r | r ∈ Tep. ←> Tes x | r | =2} Veparture = 1 toronto, montreal, vanconer3 Pestination = { beizing, seoul, penang?


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A single relation

A single relation

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
The relation to the p



Relational Operations: Domain, Range, Inverse

$$r = \{(a/1), (b/2), (c/3), (a/4), (b/5), (c/6), (d/1), (e/2), (f/3)\}$$
 $dom(v) = \{a+b+c, d+e+f\}$
 $dom(v) \subseteq Alphabet$
 $r = \{(a,1), (b,2), (c,3), (a,4), (b,6), (c,6), (d,1), (e,2), (f,3)\}$
 $van(v) = \{1,2,3,4,5,6\}$
 $van(v) \subseteq Z$
 $r = \{(a,1), (b,2), (c,3), (a,4), (b,5), (c,6), (d,1), (e,2), (f,3)\}$
 $van(v) = \{1,2,3,4,5,6\}$
 $van(v) \subseteq Z$
 $van($

Relational Operations: Image r[{a,h}] = r[{a}]ur[sh}] $r = \{(a,1), (b,2), (c,3), (a,4), (b,5), (c,6), (d,1), (e,2), (f,3)\}$ $7 r \left[\frac{1}{16.63}\right] = \frac{1}{1} r' \left(\frac{0}{1}, r'\right) \in r \land d \in \left\{\frac{1}{16.63}\right\} = \frac{1}{1}, 2, 4, 53$ $S \subseteq Alphalet$ $S \subseteq don(r) \times not nerposony.$ $r \left[\frac{1}{143}\right] = 0$ no value $S \subseteq don(r) \times not nerposony.$ $r \left[\frac{1}{143}\right] = 0$ no no pred $S \subseteq don(r) \times not nerposony.$ Exercises • Image of {a, b} on r? ⊈ { • Image of {1, 2} on r? γ [{1,23] m/e/men! Image of {1, 2} on the inverse of r? [{1,23] = {a,b,d,e} • Calculate r's range via an image. γ [amiv] = γων(γ) • Calculate r's domain via an image. $\sqrt{\gamma_{EM(Y)}} = dom(Y)$



S= {a, b} Relational Operations: Restrictions vs. Subtractions

$$r = \{(a, 1), (b, 2), (c, 3), (a, 4), (b, 5), (c, 6), (d, 1), (e, 2), (f, 3)\}$$

$$r = \{(a, 1), (b, 2), (c, 3), (a, 4), (b, 5), (c, 6), (d, 1), (e, 2), (f, 3)\}$$

$$r = \{(a, 1), (b, 2), (c, 3), (a, 4), (b, 5), (c, 6), (d, 1), (e, 2), (f, 3)\}$$

$$r = \{(a, 1), (b, 2), (c, 3), (a, 4), (b, 5), (c, 6), (d, 1), (e, 2), (f, 3)\}$$

$$Y \Rightarrow \{1,2\} = \{(C,3), (A,4), (b,5), (C,b), (f,3)\}$$

Relational Operations: Overriding

$$r = \{(a, 1), (b, 2), (c, 3), (a, 4), (b, 5), (c, 6), (d, 1), (e, 2), (f, 3)\}$$

Example: Calculate r overridden with {(a, 3), (c, 4)}

Hint: Decompose results to those in t's domain and those not in t's domain.

Lecture 7 - Sep 25

Math Review

Relational Overriding
Functional Property
Partial Functions vs. Total Functions

Announcements/Reminders

- Today's class: notes template posted
- Event-B Summary Document
- Priorities:
 - + Lab1 → Review
 - +Lab2 → Review
- Released:
 - + ProgTest guide
 - + 2 Practice Tests and solutions
 - + Lab1, Lab2 solutions
 - + Possible change of ProgTest venue to be confirmed

$$r = \{(a, 1), (b, 2), (c, 3), (a, 4), (b, 5), (c, 6), (d, 1), (e, 2), (f, 3)\}$$

Example: Calculate r overridden with {(0, 3), (c, 4)}

Hint: Decompose results to those in t's domain and those not in t's domain.

$$\begin{array}{c}
(0, 1) & (0,$$

 $r = \{(a, 1), (b, 2), (c, 3), (a, 4), (b, 5), (c, 6), (d, 1), (e, 2), (f, 3)\}$ (a,3), (1,4) Example: Calculate overridden with {(a, 3), (c, 4)} C Alphotet Lab | (b): Account -> Z transfer form and to arcz basically 1, solution bis basics? proposed charges all pains with first elements in dom(t), they must agree with t.

Exercises: Algebraic Properties of Relational Operations


$$r = \{(a,\,1),\,(b,\,2),\,(c,\,3),\,(a,\,4),\,(b,\,5),\,(c,\,6),\,(d,\,1),\,(e,\,2),\,(f,\,3)\}$$

Define the image of set s on r in terms of other relational operations.


Hint: What range of value should be included?

Define r overridden with set t in terms of other relational operations.

Hint: To be in t's domain or not to be in t's domain?



* Fach domain value maps to at most one varge value vel Functional Property isFunctional(r) 💝 ∀ s, †1, †2 • ($s \in S \land t1 \in T \land t2 \in T$) two ((s, t1) \in $r \land$ (s, t2) \in $r \Rightarrow t1 = t2$ Q:) How to prove or disprove that a relation(r) is a function. Q: Rewrite the <u>functional property</u> using contrapositive. Visprale DShow that r= 0 (F=) = T) Find (s,ti) ev (s,tz) er but tlt 2) Go are all pairs in y, show that each dom, value maps to no more than one



e.g., $\{ \{(2, a), (1, b)\}, \{(2, a), (3, a), (1, b)\} \} \subseteq \{1, 2, 3\} \rightarrow \{a, b\}$ e.g., $\{(2, a), (1, b)\}$, $\{(2, a), (3, a), (1, b)\}$ $\{(1, 2, 3) + (a, b)\}$ a sel where each member 15 à set of pairs propery) a set la ed
paí.5

 $S = \{1, 2, 3\}$ $T = \{0, 1\}$ $T = \{0, 1\}$ $T = \{0, 1\}$ $T = \{0, 1\}$ $T = \{0, 1\}$ f(n) = 212+3n-4 13, frm 75 0(21) Y = { (1, a), (2, b), (3, a)} VD Y 75 a relation. (nost NC).

(nost NC).

(rost N / 3) y is a total tunction. Q1. Grect. Q2. Most arrivate?

Lecture 8 - Sep 30


Math Review

Rel Image vs. Func Application Modelling: Rel vs. Partial vs. Total Func Injection, Surjection, Bijection

Announcements/Reminders

- Today's class: notes template posted
- Event-B Summary Document
- Priorities:
 - + Lab1 → Review
 - + Lab2 → Review
- Change of ProgTest venue WSC106/108
- Released:
 - + ProgTest guide
 - + 2 Practice Tests and solutions
 - + Lab1, Lab2 solutions

Relational Image vs. Functional Application A function is a relation. $f \in \{1, 2, 3\} + \{a, b\}$ 75 Function $(f) \land dom(f) \subseteq \{1, 2, 3\}$ $f = \{ (3, a), (1, b) \}$ dom(+) C {1,2,3} functional application at least one value **Exercises:** $f[\{3\}] = \{\alpha^{3}\}$ corresponding range volue. pols not have the $f[{1}] = {6}$ +(z) = 1 (undefined)



Carotrolity mage Y E S COT y is also a function r[{s3]| \(\) \(\) \(\) \(\) \(\) \(\) \(\) ~> S & dom(v).

Modelling Decision: Relations vs. Functions

An organization has a system for keeping <u>track</u> of its employees as to where they are on the premises (e.g., `'Zone A, Floor 23''). To achieve this, each employee is issued with an active badge which, when scanned, synchronizes their current positions to a central database.

Assume the following two sets:

- Employee denotes the **set** of all employees working for the organization.
- Location denotes the set of all valid locations in the organization.

```
Is where_is \in Employee <-> Location appropriate?

No. e \mapsto l_1 \subseteq where\_75 \land e \mid \mapsto l_2 \subseteq where\_75

Is where_is \in Employee \Rightarrow Location appropriate?

Is where_is \in Employee \Rightarrow Location appropriate?

Is where_is \in Employee \Rightarrow Location appropriate?
```

Functions (dow, ran) (dom) (VCM) MIECTAL Surjectale bijectrue partial sujection portial injection partia n.a. tota |

** Contrapositive: SI = Sz => 7(GI,t) Ef 1 Injective Functions (52,t) €+) isInjective(f) $\forall \overrightarrow{s}, t_1, t_7 \cdot (s \in S \land t_1 \in T \land t_2 \in T) \Rightarrow ((s, t_1) \in f \land (s, t_2) \in f \Rightarrow t_1 = t_2)$ $\forall s_1, s_2, t \cdot (s_1 \in S \land s_2 \in S \land t \in T) \Rightarrow ((s_1, t) \in f \land (s_2, t) \in f \Rightarrow s_1 = s_2)$ If f is a **partial injection**, we write: $|f \in S \Rightarrow T|$ \circ e.g., $\{\emptyset, \{(1, \mathbf{a})\}, \{(2, \mathbf{a}), (3, \mathbf{b})\}\} \subseteq \{1, 2, 3\} \Rightarrow \{a, b\}$ \circ e.g., $\{(1, \mathbf{b}), (2, a), (3, \mathbf{b})\} \notin \{1, 2, 3\} \Rightarrow \{a, b\}$ \circ e.g., $\{(1, \mathbf{b}), (3, \mathbf{b})\} \notin \{1, 2, 3\} \Rightarrow \{a, b\}$ If f is a **total injection**, we write: $|f \in S \rightarrow T|$ \circ e.g., $\{1,2,3\} \rightarrow \{a,b\} = \emptyset$ \circ e.g., $\{(2,d),(1,a),(3,c)\} \in \{1,2,3\} \rightarrow \{a,b,c,d\}$ (2,b) Ef \circ e.g., $\{(\mathbf{2},d),(\mathbf{1},c)\} \notin \{1,2,3\} \Rightarrow \{a,b,c,d\}$ \circ e.g., $\{(2,\mathbf{d}),(1,c),(3,\mathbf{d})\} \notin \{1,2,3\} \rightarrow \{a,b,c,d\}$

> functions A injective trop. If f is a **partial injection**, we write: $f \in S \rightarrow T$ • e.g., $\{\emptyset,\{(1,a)\},\{(2,a),(3,b)\}\}\subseteq\{1,2,3\} \Rightarrow \{a,b\}$ Inj X: distint don who I and Z both map to b. \circ e.g., $\{(1, \mathbf{b}), (2, a), (3, \mathbf{b})\} \notin \{1, 2, 3\} \Rightarrow \{a, b\} \times \text{Aut} \lor \circ \text{e.g.}, \{(1, \mathbf{b}), (3, \mathbf{b})\} \notin \{1, 2, 3\} \Rightarrow \{a, b\} \times \bullet$ If f is a **total injection**, we write: $|f \in S \rightarrow T|$ • e.g., $\{1,2,3\} \rightarrow \{a,b\} = \emptyset$ e.g., $\{(2,d),(1,a),(3,c)\} \in \{1,2,3\} \rightarrow \{a,b,c,d\}$ e.g., $\{(\mathbf{2},d), (\mathbf{1},c)\} \notin \{1,2,3\} \rightarrow \{a,b,c,d\}$ e.g., $\{(2,\mathbf{d}),(1,c),(3,\mathbf{d})\} \notin \{1,2,3\} \rightarrow \{a,b,c,d\}$ I DISTINCT DON VALUES map to distinct YOU VOLUES -> MIETERP.

$$\{(1,a),(2,a)\}$$

$$\{(1,a),(2,a)\}$$

$$\{(1,a),(1,b)\}$$

$$\{(1,a),(1,b)\}$$

S <-> T : set of all relations on set of all possible cotal agrerous. If f is a **total injection**, we write: $f \in S \rightarrow T$ • e.g., $\{1, 2, 3\} \mapsto \{a, b\} = \emptyset$ • e.g., $\{(2,d), (1,a), (3,c)\} \in \{1,2,3\} \rightarrow \{a,b,c,d\}$ \circ e.g. $9\{(2,d), (1,c)\} \notin \{1,2,3\} \rightarrow \{a,b,c,d\}$ \circ e.g. $\{(2, \mathbf{d}), (1, c), (3, \mathbf{d})\} \notin \{1, 2, 3\} \rightarrow \{a, b, c, d\}$ 1 Violetes

Surjective Functions

$$total(f) \iff dow(f) = S$$
 $isSurjective(f) \iff ran(f) = T$

If f is a partial surjection, we write: $f \in S \Rightarrow T$
 \circ e.g., $\{(1,b),(2,a)\},\{(1,b),(2,a),(3,b)\} \subseteq \{1,2,3\} \Rightarrow \{a,b\}$
 \circ e.g., $\{(2,a),(1,a),(3,a)\} \notin \{1,2,3\} \Rightarrow \{a,b\}$
 \circ e.g., $\{(2,a),(1,b),(3,a)\},\{(2,b),(1,a),(3,b)\} \subseteq \{1,2,3\} \Rightarrow \{a,b\}$
 \circ e.g., $\{(2,a),(3,b)\} \notin \{1,2,3\} \Rightarrow \{a,b\}$
 \circ e.g., $\{(2,a),(3,b)\} \notin \{1,2,3\} \Rightarrow \{a,b\}$
 \circ e.g., $\{(2,a),(3,a),(1,a)\} \notin \{1,2,3\} \Rightarrow \{a,b\}$

Bijective Functions

f is bijective/a bijection/one-to-one correspondence if f is total, injective, and surjective.

```
• e.g., \{1,2,3\} \longrightarrow \{a,b\} = \emptyset \longrightarrow \{ No injective function can be made \} e.g., \{\{(1,a),(2,b),(3,c)\},\{(2,a),(3,b),(1,c)\}\} \subseteq \{1,2,3\} \longrightarrow \{a,b,c\} \supseteq e.g., \{(2,b),(3,c),(4,a)\} \notin \{1,2,3,4\} \longrightarrow \{a,b,c\} \supseteq e.g., \{(1,a),(2,b),(3,c),(4,a)\} \notin \{1,2,3,4\} \longrightarrow \{a,b,c\} \supseteq e.g., \{(1,a),(2,b),(3,c),(4,a)\} \notin \{1,2,3,4\} \longrightarrow \{a,b,c\} \supseteq e.g., \{(1,a),(2,b),(3,c),(4,a)\} \notin \{1,2,3,4\} \longrightarrow \{a,b,c\}
```

	total of hunc	TATI	Sur (·	
Ф	X	W		X
2		X		X
3			X	X

X={1,2,3,43 Exercise Y = {A, B, C, D} partial ·B **+**B total injection surjection ≯d bijection →B →C 10

Lecture 10 - Oct 7

Bridge Controller


Modelling Decision: Formulating Arrays
Correct by Construction
State Space of a Model
M0: Abstraction, Context, Machine

Announcements/Reminders

- Today's class: notes template posted
- Last Thursday's class:

A lecture video on formal background to be released

- ProgTest being graded
- WrittenTest1 (Oct 22) coming after the reading week




(4) $\Omega \in \mathbb{Z} \longrightarrow \text{Strang} \xrightarrow{\gamma_{\text{the set}}} \text{set}$ $\text{Yan}(\Omega) = \text{Strang} \longrightarrow \text{Jeas-ible}$ (5) -> related to (3) ant data tipe

bridge controller: <mo, M, Mz> N+1 models Correct by Construction Astrace mode/ + Harray timal most "Superman" mode 1. Me 73 move concrete mode 1


and mode 1 to the mode 1 To show that welmonent is not teasible. Concrete than Me Miss of Ly instrum december to make the standard of t With a fish of L> instead, distribute properties

State Space of a Model concrete space 1 * 1 to **Definition**: The state space of a model is the set of all possible valuations of its declared constants and variables, subject to declared constraints. > Doublinations of values Say an initial model of a bank system with two constants and a variable: pare = 2 gay/ast 17st typing consticutes 1 muarrant 3




Mainland


Bridge Controller: Abstraction in the Initial Model



Bridge Controller: State Space of the Initial Model









State Transition Diagram on an Example Configuration


Lecture 11 - Oct 9

Bridge Controller

Before-After Predicates
Sequents: Syntax and Semantics
Inv. Preservation: PO/VC as as Sequent


Announcements/Reminders

- Today's class: notes template posted
- Last Thursday's class:
 - A lecture video on formal background to be released
- ProgTest being graded
- WrittenTest1 (Oct 22) coming after the reading week
 - + Guide and example questions to be released
 - + An in-person review session




UL out connot happen anymore Two independent concerns safe in cased safe 4 safe safe ~ safe state ~ enabled event action for ML-aut: Mout MED M + (ML-out MLout ML-art guard for ML: out enalled enabled discilled NED (041) 6:241 75 telse) even though This safe for 1 to be must,


Before-After Predicates of Event Actions




Exercise: Event Actions vs. Before-After Predicates

Q. Are the following event actions suitable for a swap between x and y?





Sequents: Syntax and Semantics > turnstile. Syntax 1+1 < d Q. What does it mean when H is empty/absent? D True + G ⇒ True ⇒ G ← → G ~ prove G without any assumption Truse - G ← True ~ no hypotheses means it is proved!



Lecture 12 - Oct 21


Bridge Controller

Before-After Predicate, Inv. Preservation Formal Model Components WrittenTest1 Review


Announcements/Reminders

- Today's class: notes template posted
- ProgTest being graded
- WrittenTest1 (Oct 22) tomorrow

Transition of an Event a ∈ dan(b) mather b: ACOUNT -> Z withdraw Post-starp I Va. a & dom(b) => a: Account where a < dom(b) withdraw grass to Va. a∈ dou (15) > effect of event. b 4 { a 1 > b (a) - v3 b 4 [a 1-> b(a) - v3



PO/VC Rule of Invariant Preservation: Components



AXMO_ model modex Mo of axioms. Bried least accurate most accurate Event-B summary
Ly placed desktop. vorrect: botal = partial = 121 Print ppy four own) mosé attavall: 5 37 IPCSF ACCURAR : 500

a: N +> (Z) all rangers A: N) -> Int

Lesible)

Chapt presible)

Chapt presible)

A: N ->> Z (not feasible) A: N ->> Int (feasible).

 $\frac{1}{2} \frac{1}{2} \frac{1}$ Well-de-med ex Pubsitions S= {a,b, c} $\gamma: S \longleftrightarrow T$ T= {1.23 La valid relation contains members for J and T only. v1 = { (a,1), (b,z), (a,z)} v[[fc3] = p v[[fa65] 745 not well-defined.


Lecture 13 - Oct 23

Bridge Controller

Proof Obligation Rule: Inv. Preservation Inference Rule: Syntax and Semantics Sequent Proofs via Inference Rules

Announcements/Reminders

- Today's class: notes template posted
- ProgTest results to be released by next Tuesday's class
- WrittenTest 1 results to be released by early Monday



variables: n constants: d invariants: axioms: inv0(1) $n \in \mathbb{N}$ axm $0 1 : d \in \mathbb{N}$ inv0(2); $n \le d$ 10: ML_out/INV_I/INV martant preservation

ML₋out begin n := n + 1end ML₋in begin n := n - 1end

A(c)I(c, v)G(c, v) $f_i(c, E(c, v))$

Poz: ML-out/mv0_2/INV

Pos: ML-M/TONO_1/INV

Tal: ML-TA/TANO_Z/INV

Pot: MLONE/ MUD_3/INV

Pob: ML-m/m0_3/INV

M2_out/ TOV 0_1/ INV P.O. is related to

P.O. is related to

Whether or you transition


Whether or state event aution


Facing a some event aution

The preserve in an event

The preserve in a preserve


PO/VC Rule of Invariant Preservation: Sequents






may be used as a Proof re write c as (Asymed to be time)

Proof of Sequent: Steps and Structure





Understanding Inference Rule: OR_L Q. Roes OR_L help us: ANZR (A) split one sequent to prove into $H, P \vee Q \vdash R$ (B) Combine two sequents to proce To prove C; OR OR SUFFICTENT to prove of appear

MON the Us to provide


Lecture 14 - Oct 28

Bridge Controller

Justifying the OR_L Inference Rule Interpreting Unprovable Sequents


Announcements/Reminders

- Today's class: notes template posted
- ProgTest and WrittenTest1 results released
- Tomorrow's lab sessions (1:30 to 3:30):
 Shangru to go over parts of your ProgTest
- Lab3 released



$$\frac{H \vdash P}{H \vdash P \lor Q} \quad \mathbf{OR} \mathbf{R} \mathbf{1}$$

$$\frac{H \vdash Q}{H \vdash P \lor Q} \quad \mathbf{OR} \mathbf{R2}$$






Justifying Inference Rule: OR_L

$$\begin{array}{c} (P\Rightarrow R) \wedge (Q\Rightarrow R) \Rightarrow P \vee Q \Rightarrow R = Tme. \\ (P\Rightarrow R) \wedge (Q\Rightarrow R) \Rightarrow T \times V \otimes S \Rightarrow R = Tme. \\ (P\Rightarrow R) \wedge (Q\Rightarrow R) \Rightarrow T \times V \otimes S \Rightarrow R = Tme. \\ (P\Rightarrow R) \wedge (Q\Rightarrow R) \Rightarrow T \times V \otimes S \Rightarrow R \Rightarrow T \otimes S \Rightarrow R \otimes S$$

Discharging POs of original mO: Invariant Preservation



greet that this sequent 75 improvable; we may want to add Gove addressal 7 Gastants Help. hypothes is the model place to add the extia (c, **E(c, v)**


4 sequents to prove ML_out/and_1/INU Po rule (e.g. IN) State part dynamic part ML = / = 0 2/ INV attempt prove UL_m/mJO_1/INV uprovable.

Lecture 15 - Oct 30

Bridge Controller


Revising M0: Adding Event Guards Initializing System, Establishing Inv. Deadlock Free: Intro, PO, 1st Attempt

PO/VC Rule of Invariant Preservation: Revised MO





 \mathbb{Q} . How many PO/VC rules for model m0? 4


Discharging POs of revised m0: Invariant Preservation




Initializing the System










The Initialization Event








Discharging PO of Invariant Establishment







 $H1, H2 \vdash G$

MON


Bridge Controller: REACTIVE SYSTEM Exert enabled for the system to progress unacceptable: deadlock to occur 7 G (ML-out) 17 G (ML-in) [deadlock condition] 7 (G(ML-art) V G(ML-m)) G(ULONE) V G (ULTIN) [deadlock freedom and.]







$$H,P \vdash P$$



$$H(\mathbf{F}), \mathbf{E} = \mathbf{F} \vdash P(\mathbf{F})$$



$$H(E), E = F \vdash P(E)$$

EQ_RL

EQ

Discharging PO of DLF: First Attempt HYP $H,P \vdash P$ $\frac{H,P \vdash R \qquad H,Q \vdash R}{H,P \lor Q \vdash R}$ $H1 \vdash G$ OR_L OR_R1 MON OR_{R2} $H1, H2 \vdash G$ $d \in \mathbb{N}$ $n \in \mathbb{N}$ 呼 $n \le d$ **EQ_LR** $n < d \lor n > 0$ $d \in \mathbb{N}$ $n \in \mathbb{N}$ $n < d \lor n = d$ $n < d \lor n > 0$ MON n < dOR₋R1 ⊢ HYP $n < d \lor n = d$ OR_L > unprovable given 40 hypo $n < d \lor n > 0$ EQ_LR, MON ⊢ OR_R2 _ $d < d \lor d > 0$

Lecture 16 - Nov 4


Bridge Controller

DLF: Alternative Unprovable Sequent 1st Refinement: Abstraction 1st Refinement: State Space

Announcements/Reminders

- Today's class: notes template posted
- WrittenTest2 next Wednesday (November 12):
 - + Guide released
 - + Practice Questions released
 - + Lab3 solution to be release soon (for WrittenTest2)


Discharging PO of DLF: Revisiting First Attempt



Understanding the Failed Proof on DLF

ML_in ML out variables: n constants: d when ML out when Island n < dn > 0and Mainland then then invariants: bridge inv0 1: $n \in \mathbb{N}$ n := n - 1ML in n := n + 1 $inv0_2 : n < d$ end end Unprovable Sequent: ⊢ d > 0 Not being able to prove d > 0 Lo current model may N70/098 7t:

Discharging PO of DLF: Second Attempt



Discharging PO of DLF: Second Attempt

 $H,P \vdash P$

$$\frac{H1 \vdash G}{H1, H2 \vdash G} \quad MON$$

$$\frac{H,P \vdash R \qquad H,Q \vdash R}{H,P \lor Q \vdash R}$$

$$\frac{H \vdash P}{H \vdash P \lor Q} \quad \mathbf{OR_R1}$$


OR₋L

$$\frac{H \vdash Q}{H \vdash P \lor Q} \quad \mathsf{OR} \mathsf{_R2}$$

HYP

$$d \in \mathbb{N}$$
 $d > 0$
 $n \in \mathbb{N}$
 $n \le d$
 \vdash
 $n < d \lor n > 0$

Summary of the Initial Model: Provably Correct



- + Invariant Establishment
- + Invariant Preservation
- + Deadlock Freedom

efinement

added "Conseteness"


added "Conseteness"

one way

one way

and a, b, c Bridge Controller; Abstraction in the 1st Refinement rold abblack BIBNS mO: initial, most abstract ML out Island and Mainland bridge ML in IL in second, more concrete one way **Island** Bridge REQ1 The system is controlling cars on a bridge connecting the mainland to an island. REQ3 The bridge is one-way or the other, not both at the same time.

Mo .. AL - M abstract NEISTEN , existence MLat, MLM MI WILM CONOVETE IL-M, IL-art MIZ stance!



Lecture 17 - Nov 6


Bridge Controller

Concrete Guards: ML_out, ML_in Guard Strengthening: Intuition, PO


Announcements/Reminders

- Today's class: notes template posted
- WrittenTest2 next Wednesday (November 12):
 - + Guide released
 - + Practice Questions released
 - + Lab3 solution to be release soon (for WrittenTest2)


Bridge Controller: Guards of "old" Events 1st Refinement 1/2d ML_out: A car exits mainland ML_out IL in (getting on the bridge). one way Island (a) From Mo, destroit guard of ML-out: ML_out Bridge g when then (2) Atb a:= a+1 end axioms: constants: $axm0_1: d \in \mathbb{N}$ ML_in: A car enters mainland $axm0_2: d > 0$ (getting off the bridge). Q. Is it necessary to ML_in invariants: add a grand: $inv1_1: a \in \mathbb{N}$ inv1_2 : *b* ∈ \mathbb{N} variables: a, b, c then inv1_3 : c ∈ \mathbb{N} c := c - 1**inv1_4**: a + b + c = n6=0 V C=0 /4 EN/-5V **inv1_5**: $a = 0 \lor c = 0$ end





Before-After Predicates of Event Actions: 1st Refinement



States, Invariants, Events: Abstract vs. Concrete







Concrete m1

variables:
$$a, b, c$$

ML_out
when
 $a+b
when
 $c>0$

invariants:
 $c=0$
inv1_1 ($a \in \mathbb{N}$
inv1_2; $b \in \mathbb{N}$$

 $inv1_4$ a + b + c = n

v and v': abstract variables in pre-/post-states w and w': concrete variables in pre-/post-states

a := a + 1

c := c - 1

I(C)(V): list of abstract invariants

J(C)(V)(W): list of concrete invariants

E(c, v): an abstract event's effect

F(c, w): a concrete event's effect

Predicates: Weaker vs. Stronger Weakest predricate: The P => g Ly P 7s "stronger" than g Strongest predicate: Falsp $fx \mid False 3 = \emptyset$ Ls & is "weaker" than P $P(x) \triangleq x > 0$ [x | pexs3] C [x | gen]

we cher preducts

more values

more values

more values

more values

more values 4(x) = x 7 0 $q(x) \Rightarrow p(x) x$

Refinement: Why Guard Strengthening Principle: a re-tinement's behaviour

should be consistent with the abstract model's Mi: ML-out grand Why is it wong: G=>H (=> no new behaviour introduced by the Congress event). e.g. for some values
ML-out 75 d756bled in No but enable d

PO/VC Rule of Guard Strengthening: Sequents

Abstract mo

variables: n

invariants: inv0 1 : $n \in \mathbb{N}$

inv0_2 : *n* ≤ *d*

ML_out when n < dthen n := n + 1end

ML_in when n > 0then n := n - 1end

Concrete m1

variables: a, b, c

invariants:

inv1 1 : a ∈ N inv1_2 : b ∈ N inv1_3 : c ∈ N

 $inv1_4: a+b+c=n$

inv1_5: $a = 0 \lor c = 0$

ML out when

> a+b < dc = 0

then

a := a + 1

end

 ML_{in}

when

c > 0then

c := c - 1

end

A(C) attens I(c, v)J(c, v, w) $H(c, \mathbf{w})$ ML_out/GRO

concrete grd

strolf grd

DEN ATOMO_1

axmo_z ecentre: 0 > 0

1-CVAT IND_1

MED TONO_Z - MED

QEN Q+6+[=1

C=0 V=0

Q. How many PO/VC rules for model m1?

Written lest

Slide 58

ML-out

(1< d)

ML-out C = 0 $A + b \leq d$

Lecture 18 - Nov 11

Bridge Controller

Guard Strengthening: Review
INV Preservation: POs
INV Preservation: Commuting Diagram

Announcements/Reminders

- Today's class: notes template posted
- WrittenTest2 Wednesday (November 12)

ML-out (G) Refinement: Guard Farengthening * what's enabled in also enabled ** come scenaros aloned a+b+c=n change MI). A., Ato Ed => N ed L'M MI, ML one is enabled d when n=d s but A 75 drsabled

Discharging POs of m1: Guard Strengthening in Refinement

ML_out/GRD

 $d \in \mathbb{N}$ d > 0 $n \in \mathbb{N}$ n < d $a \in \mathbb{N}$ $b \in \mathbb{N}$ $\boldsymbol{c} \in \mathbb{N}$ a+b+c=n $a = 0 \lor c = 0$ a+b < dc = 0n < d

 $\frac{H1 \vdash G}{H1, H2 \vdash G} \quad MON$

 $\frac{H(\mathbf{F}), \mathbf{E} = \mathbf{F} \vdash P(\mathbf{F})}{H(\mathbf{E}), \mathbf{E} = \mathbf{F} \vdash P(\mathbf{E})} \quad \mathbf{EQ_LR}$

 $H,P \vdash P$

Discharging POs of m1: Guard Strengthening in Refinement

ML_in/GRD

 $d \in \mathbb{N}$ d > 0 $n \in \mathbb{N}$ n < d $a \in \mathbb{N}$ $b \in \mathbb{N}$ $\boldsymbol{c} \in \mathbb{N}$ a+b+c=n $a = 0 \lor c = 0$ c > 0

 $\frac{H1 \vdash G}{H1, H2 \vdash G} \quad MON$ $H(F), E = F \vdash P(F)$

 $H,P \vdash P$ HYP $\bot \vdash P$ FALSE_L


 $H(\mathbf{F}), \mathbf{E} = \mathbf{F} \vdash P(\mathbf{F})$ $H(\mathbf{E}), \mathbf{E} = \mathbf{F} \vdash P(\mathbf{E})$


EQ_LR

 $H,P \vdash R \qquad H,Q \vdash R$ $H,P \lor Q \vdash R$

OR_L

n > 0





Discharging POs of m1: Invariant Preservation in Refinement

ML_out/inv1_4/INV

$$d \in \mathbb{N}$$

 $d > 0$
 $n \in \mathbb{N}$
 $n \le d$
 $a \in \mathbb{N}$
 $b \in \mathbb{N}$
 $c \in \mathbb{N}$
 $a + b + c = n$
 $a = 0 \lor c = 0$
 $a + b < d$
 $c = 0$
 $(a+1) + b + c = (n+1)$

$$\frac{H1 \vdash G}{H1, H2 \vdash G} \quad MON$$

$$\frac{H(\mathbf{F}), \mathbf{E} = \mathbf{F} \vdash P(\mathbf{F})}{H(\mathbf{E}), \mathbf{E} = \mathbf{F} \vdash P(\mathbf{E})} \quad \mathbf{EQ_LR}$$

Discharging POs of m1: Invariant Preservation in Refinement

PO of Invariant Establishment in Refinement



inv1 3: $c \in \mathbb{N}$ $inv1_4: a+b+c=n$ **inv1**_**5**: $a = 0 \lor c = 0$

init begin

a := 0b := 0

c := 0

end

Components

K(c): effect of abstract init

L(c): effect of concrete init

Rule of Invariant Establishment

A(c) \vdash $J_i(c, K(c), L(c))$

Exercise:


Generate Sequents from the INV rule.

Q. How many PO/VC rules for model m1?

Discharging PO of Invariant Establishment in Refinement

$$d \in \mathbb{N}$$
 $d > 0$
 \vdash
 $0 + 0 + 0 = 0$

init/inv1_4/INV



$$d ∈ \mathbb{N}$$
 $d > 0$
⊢
 $0 = 0 ∨ 0 = 0$

init/inv1_5/INV

<u>Lecture 19 - Nov 13</u>

Bridge Controller

New Events: IL_in, IL_out Simulation of New Events: skip Livelock/Divergence: Example

Announcements/Reminders


- Today's class: notes template posted
- Lab4 to be released

10 ML-in abstraction Events A; b, C MI ML-out concrete

MI ML-out converte

MI ML-in New events: III in , Il out Bridge Controller: Guarded Actions of "new" Events in 1st Refinement" IL_in: A car enters island ML_out (getting off the bridge). one way IL_in Bridge when ML in then end axioms: constants: $axm0_1: d \in \mathbb{N}$ IL_out: A car exits island $axm0_2: d > 0$ (getting on the bridge). 25, invariants: IL_out $[av_1]: a \in \mathbb{N}$ when All In $inv1_2: b \in \mathbb{N}$ variables: a, b, c inv1 3: $c \in \mathbb{N}$ then b>0 $inv1_4: a+b+c=n$ inv1 5: $a = 0 \lor c = 0$ end

Before-After Predicates of Event Actions: 1st Refinement





IL_out


when b > 0 a = 0then b := b - 1 c := c + 1end











Discharging POs of m1: Invariant Preservation in Refinement


IL_in/inv1_4/INV


 $d \in \mathbb{N}$ d > 0 $n \in \mathbb{N}$ $n \leq d$ $a \in \mathbb{N}$ $b \in \mathbb{N}$ $c \in \mathbb{N}$ a+b+c=n $a = 0 \lor c = 0$ a > 0(a-1)+(b+1)+c=n

$$\frac{H1 \vdash G}{H1, H2 \vdash G} \quad MON \qquad H, P \vdash P \qquad HYP$$



Discharging POs of m1: Invariant Preservation in Refinement






Exercise Show the abstract & anorese transitions of:

abstract transitions: <init, Mc_ont, skip, skip, ML_on, Skip, ML_on, Skip, ML_on, ML_on, TL_onf, ML_on,

Livelock Caused by New Events Diverging -

An alternative m1 (for demonstration)



A possible scenario that's problematic: skipt interleased of Abstract Transitions: < mit, ML-out, with the entry control of transitions: < init, ML-out, IL-in, IL-out,

ML out e way Island Bridge

SHOCKED

Livelock / Vivergence -> caused by an infinite interleaving of

new events (2 bisy looping in the abstract model). → (system) variant (∈ N) ~ not a solution to the lock mak sure ~ a measure of the # of times this mot new erents with interleave

Lecture 20 - Nov 18

Bridge Controller

Invariant vs. Variant
Observing Patterns of Variant Values
POs of Variants: NAT vs. VAR

Announcements/Reminders

- Today's class: notes template posted
- Lab4 released
- A reference paper for the tabular method (Lab4)
- Online course evaluation

Invariant Us. Variant Invaviant: Boolean expression that should

ystem)

always hold (after init and all event
occurrences) 4Lost ZLM --EN 7/0 Variant: Integer expression that may thange after event occurrences.

Use of a Variant to Measure New Events Converging

fixed

variables: a, b, c

invariants:

inv1 1: $a \in \mathbb{N}$ inv1 2: $b \in \mathbb{N}$

inv1 3: $c \in \mathbb{N}$ inv1 4: a+b+c=n

 $inv1_5: a = 0 \lor c = 0$

ML out when a+b < dc = 0then

a := a + 1end

MI in when c > 0then

end

c := c - 1

II in when

a := <u>a − 1</u> b := b + 1end

variant: 2 ·

IL out when b > 0a = 0then b := b - 1c := c + 1end

Variants for New Events: 2 · a + b


<init, ML_out, ML_out, IL_in, IL_in, IL_out, IL_out, ML_in, ML_in >

a = 2 a = 1. a = 0. a = 0 a = 0 a = 0 a = 0b = 0 b = 0 b = 1 b = 2 b = 1 b = 0 b = 0b = 0

c = 0 c = 0 c = 0 c = 0 c = 1 c = 2 c = 1 c = 0

concrete events

PO of Convergence/Non-Divergence/Livelock Freedom



Exercise Given variant: a + b (1) Trace the value of V using the same trace. Can the same patterns be observed? (2) Formulate the NAR and NAT POs.


(2) * Z seguents & pane)


ILM, ILLOUT NAT. VAR. 3) Are they provade?

Example Inference Rules (HATP > Q) (H => PVQ)

$$H \mapsto P \vee Q$$

$$H \mapsto P \wedge Q$$





Lecture 21 - Nov 20

Bridge Controller

Relative Deadlock Freedom m2: abstraction, superposition, invariant

Announcements/Reminders

- Today's class: notes template posted
- Lab4 released
- A reference paper for the tabular method (Lab4)
- Online course evaluation

Idea of Relative Deadlock Freedom VINCTIONS Guard Strengthering The Ts book! Cfor reactive systems) 2. a refinement should not mandap a TC stanció not exitad the abstrart who DLF provable $H_1(c, w) \vee ... \vee H_n(c, w)$ $H_1(c,w) \vee \ldots \vee H_n(c,w)$ $G_1(c,v) \vee ... \vee G_m(c,v)$ DL-FIRE SCRADIOS

PO of Relative Deadlock Freedom

Abstract mo

ML out variables: n when invariants: then $inv0_1: n \in \mathbb{N}$ inv0 2: n < d

n < dn := n + 1end

ML in when n > 0then n := n - 1end

Concrete m1

invariants: inv1_1: $a \in \mathbb{N}$ inv1 2: $b \in \mathbb{N}$ inv1_3 : $c \in \mathbb{N}$ inv1 4: a+b+c=n**inv1_5**: $a = 0 \lor c = 0$

variables: a, b, c

when a+b < dc = 0then a := a + 1end

ML_out

when C > 0then c := c - 1end

ML in

IL in IL_out when when b > 0a > 0 a = 0then then a := a - 1b := b - 1b := b + 1c := c + 1end end

 $\overline{c,v} \vee \overline{G_m}(c,v)$

 $H_1(c, w) \vee \cdots \vee H_n(c, w)$

NEW M \le d

0 EM

atht Czn a=0 1 (=0

DLF

Discharging POs of m1: Relative Deadlock Freedom

Part 1

$$\frac{H1 \vdash G}{H1, H2 \vdash G} \quad MON$$


$$\frac{H(\mathbf{F}), \mathbf{E} = \mathbf{F} \vdash P(\mathbf{F})}{H(\mathbf{E}), \mathbf{E} = \mathbf{F} \vdash P(\mathbf{E})} \quad \mathbf{EQ_LR}$$

$$\frac{H, \neg P \vdash Q}{H \vdash P \lor Q} \quad \mathbf{OR} . \mathbf{R}$$

```
d \in \mathbb{N}
d > 0
n \in \mathbb{N}
n \le d
a \in \mathbb{N}
b \in \mathbb{N}
c \in \mathbb{N}
a+b+c=n
a = 0 \lor c = 0
n < d \lor n > 0
       a+b < d \land c = 0
 \vee c > 0
 \vee a > 0
 \vee b > 0 \land a = 0
```

Discharging POs of m1: Relative Deadlock Freedom






$$d > 0$$

 $b = 0 \lor b > 0$
 $b < d \land 0 = 0$
 $\lor b > 0 \land 0 = 0$

Initial Model and 1st Refinement: Provably Correct




Abstract m0


Concrete m1

Correctness Criteria:


- + Guard Strengthening
- + Invariant Establishment
- + Invariant Preservation
- + Convergence/Livelock
- + Relative Deadlock Freedom




Bridge Controller: Abstraction in the 2nd Refinement








Dynamic Part of Model



invariants:

inv2 1 : *ml_tl* ∈ *COLOUR* inv2 2 : *il_tl* ∈ *COLOUR*



Static Part of Model

sets: COLOR

constants: red. green

axioms:

axm2_1 : COLOR = {green, red} axm2_2: green # red

Exercises

inv2_3: being allowed to exit ML means limited cars & no crash

inv2_4: being allowed to exit IL means some car in IL & no crash



Lecture 22 - Nov 25

Bridge Controller


2nd Refinement: Splitting Guards 2nd Ref.: Unprovable Sequent for INV Adding an Invariant

Announcements/Reminders


- Today's class: notes template posted
- Lab4 released
- A reference paper for the tabular method (Lab4)

Bridge Controller: "Old" and "New" Events Single Car Travel: ISLAND L. Oml_tl_green, ML_out; 15 pot of **MAINLAND** @il_tl_green, IL_out, ML_in> a, b, c are computer narrables 4) drivers have no access to their values L) ML. out drives should only about the conserved about be conserved about.

Bridge Controller: Guards of "old" Events 2nd Refinement



Bridge Controller: Guards of "new" Events 2nd Refinement



sets: COLOR

constants: red, green

axioms:

axm2_1 : COLOR = {green, red} axm2_2 : green ≠ red

variables:

a, b, c ml tl

 $il_{-}tl$

invariants:


inv2_1: *ml_tl* ∈ *COLOUR* **inv2_2**: *il_tl* ∈ *COLOUR*

inv2_3: $ml_tl = green \Rightarrow a + b < d \land c = 0$

inv2_4: $iI_{-}tI = green \Rightarrow b > 0 \land a = 0$


ML_tl_green:

turn the traffic light ml_tl to green



IL_tl_green:

turn the traffic light il_tl to green



PO/VC Rule of Invariant Preservation: Sequents

Abstract m1

variables: a, b, cinvariants: $inv1_-1: a \in \mathbb{N}$ $inv1_-2: b \in \mathbb{N}$ $inv1_-3: c \in \mathbb{N}$ $inv1_-4: a+b+c=n$ $inv1_-5: a=0 \lor c=0$

ML out

IL_out when b > 0 a = 0 then b := b - 1 c := c + 1 end

A(c) $I(c, \mathbf{v})$ $J(c, \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{w})$ $H(c, \mathbf{w})$ \vdash $J_i(c, E(c, \mathbf{v}), F(c, \mathbf{w}))$

Concrete m2

variables:
a, b, c
ml_tl
il_tl

invariants:

inv2_1 : ml_tl ∈ COLOUR inv2_2 : il_tl ∈ COLOUR

inv2_3: $ml_t t = green \Rightarrow a + b < d \land c = 0$ inv2_4: $il_t t = green \Rightarrow b > 0 \land a = 0$

when

ml_tl = green

then

a := a + 1

end


when
il_tl = green
then

b := b - 1 c := c + 1end

Exercise: Specify IL_out/inv2_3/INV

ML_out/inv2_4/INV

with ML_out's effect in the post-state



Example Inference Rules

$$\begin{array}{c}
H, P, Q \vdash R \\
\hline
H, P, P \Rightarrow Q \vdash R
\end{array}$$
IMP_L



$$\frac{H,P \vdash Q}{H \vdash P \Rightarrow Q} \quad \text{IMP_R}$$


$$H, \neg Q \vdash P$$

$$H, \neg P \vdash Q$$
NOT_L

7Q > P

Discharging POs of m2: Invariant Preservation

First Attempt



Discharging POs of m2: Invariant Preservation

First Attempt



IL_out/inv2_3/INV

$$\begin{array}{c|c} H \vdash P & H \vdash Q \\ \hline H \vdash P \land Q & \textbf{AND_R} & \hline H, P, Q \vdash R \\ \hline H, P, Q \vdash R & H, P \vdash Q \\ \end{array}$$

$$\frac{H, P, Q \vdash R}{H, P, P \Rightarrow Q \vdash R} \quad \mathbf{IMP_L}$$

$$\frac{H, P \vdash Q}{H \vdash P \Rightarrow Q} \quad \mathsf{IMP_R}$$

MON

green
$$\neq$$
 red

ml_tl = green \Rightarrow a + b < d \land c = 0

il_tl = green

-

ml_tl = green \Rightarrow a + (b - 1) < d \land (c + 1) = 0

IMP_R

green
$$\neq$$
 red

ml_tl = green \Rightarrow a + b < d \lambda c = 0


il_tl = green


ml_tl = green

\(\triangle \)


a + (b - 1) < d \lambda (c + 1) = 0

```
areen ± red
        a+b < d \land c = 0
        iI_{-}tI = areen
IMP_L
        mI_{-}tI = green
        a + (b-1) < d \land (c+1) = 0
```





areen + red




(0+1)=0



SHOCKED

Fixed

Understanding the Failed Proof on INV



$$= \{ ved \neq green \land \overline{l} = grea \}$$

$$= \{ ved \neq green (avoin) \}$$

$$= \{ de margan \}$$

$$= \{ de margan \}$$

$$= ved \lor \overline{l} = ved$$

$$= ved \lor \overline{l} = ved$$

Fixing m2: Adding an Invariant

Abstract m1

variables: a, b, c

invariants:

inv1_1 : $a \in \mathbb{N}$ inv1_2 : $b \in \mathbb{N}$

 $inv1_3: c \in \mathbb{N}$

inv1_4: a+b+c=n**inv1_5**: $a=0 \lor c=0$ ML_out when

a+b < dc = 0

then a := a + 1

end

REQ3

The bridge is one-way or the other, not both at the same time.

inv2_5 : ml_tl = red ∨ il_tl = red

Concrete m2

variables: a, b, c ml_tl

invariants:

il tl

inv2_1: *ml_tl* ∈ *COLOUR* **inv2 2**: *il tl* ∈ *COLOUR*

inv2_3: $ml_-tl = green \Rightarrow a + b < d \land c = 0$

inv2_4: $il_{-}tl = green \Rightarrow b > 0 \land a = 0$

ML_out
when
ml_tl = green
then

a:= a+1

a := *a* + **end**

when
il_tl = green
then

b := b - 1c := c + 1

end

II out

when

then

end

b > 0

a = 0

b := b - 1

c := c + 1


ML_out/inv2_4/INV $d \in \mathbb{N}$ axm0_1 axm0 2 d > 0COLOUR = { green, red} axm2 1 axm2_2 areen ≠ red inv0_1 $n \in \mathbb{N}$ n < dinv0_2 inv1 1 $a \in \mathbb{N}$ $b \in \mathbb{N}$ inv1_2 $C \in \mathbb{N}$ inv1 3 inv1 4 a+b+c=ninv1_5 $a = 0 \lor c = 0$ inv2 1 ml tl ∈ COLOUR inv2_2 il_tl ∈ COLOUR inv2_3 $mI_{-}tI = qreen \Rightarrow a + b < d \land c = 0$ inv2_4 $il_{-}tl = areen \Rightarrow b > 0 \land a = 0$ inv2_5 $ml_tl = red \lor il_tl = red$ Concrete guards of ML_out $ml_{\perp}tl = green$


 $iI_{-}tI = green \Rightarrow b > 0 \land (a+1) = 0$

Concrete invariant inv2_4

with ML_out's effect in the post-state

Exercise: Specify IL_out/inv2_3/INV









Assignment

areen + red

AND_R







green ≠ red
il.tl = green
ml.tl = red
ml.tl = red
ml.tl = red
ml.tl = green
t = 0

$$\frac{H, \neg Q \vdash P}{H, \neg P \vdash Q} \quad \textbf{NOT_L}$$


$$\frac{H(\mathbf{F}), \mathbf{E} = \mathbf{F} \vdash P(\mathbf{F})}{H(\mathbf{E}), \mathbf{E} = \mathbf{F} \vdash P(\mathbf{E})} \quad \mathbf{EQ.LR}$$

$$\frac{H,P \vdash R \qquad H,Q \vdash R}{H,P \lor Q \vdash R} \quad \mathbf{OR_L}$$

Lecture 23 - Nov 27


Bridge Controller

Adding Actions, Splitting Events
Preventing Livelock/Divergence
Proving Livelock/Divergence Freedom



To susped (Thursday) $(avz_3: ml_tl_g) \Rightarrow a+b< d \land l=0$ $(avz_4: 7l_tl_g) \Rightarrow b>0 \land a=0$ $(avz_4: 7l_tl_g) \Rightarrow avz_4 \Rightarrow a$ IL_out/ $\sqrt{2}$ 3/INV/ ml-tl=9= $\sqrt{2}$ 0 To Viscuss (Today)
ml-tl=9 a+b<d ML_out/MVZ_3/INV IL-out/INZ_4/INV 7l_tl=9=7


Invariant Preservation: ML_out/inv2_3/INV



axm0_1 $d \in \mathbb{N}$ axm0 2 d > 0COLOUR = { areen, red} axm2 1 axm2_2 areen + red inv0 1 $n \in \mathbb{N}$ inv0 2 n < dinv1_1 $a \in \mathbb{N}$ inv1 2 $h \in \mathbb{N}$ inv13 $c \in \mathbb{N}$ inv1_4 a+b+c=ninv15 $a = 0 \lor c = 0$ inv2 1 ml tl ∈ COLOUR inv2 2 il tl ∈ COLOUR $mI_{-}tI = areen \Rightarrow a + b < d \land c = 0$ inv2_3 inv2 4 $iI_{-}tI = green \Rightarrow b > 0 \land a = 0$ inv2 5 $ml \ tl = red \lor il \ tl = red$ Concrete guards of ML_out $ml_{-}tl = areen$ Concrete invariant inv2_3 $ml_{\perp}tl = green \Rightarrow (a+1) + b < d \cdot c = 0$ with ML_out's effect in the post-state


Discharging POs of m2: Invariant Preservation

First Attempt



Understanding the Failed Proof on INV

ML-ont enabled




inv2 1: ml tl ∈ COLOUR

inv2 2: *il tl ∈ COLOUR*

ML out when ml_tl = green then a := a + 1end

IL out when il_tl = areen then b := b - 1c := c + 1end



Unprovable Sequent:

$$a + b < d$$

inv2_3: $ml_t = qreen \Rightarrow a + b < d \land c = 0$ $inv2_4$: $il_tl = areen \Rightarrow b > 0 \land a = 0$

$$c = 0$$

$$a + 1) + b < d$$

$$d = 3, b = 0, a = 0$$

 $d = 3, b = 1, a = 0$
 $d = 3, b = 0, a = 1$

d = 3, b = 0, a = 1a = 3, b = 0, a = 2


$$d = 3, b = 1, a = 1$$


+ b < d evaluates to true 1) + *b* < *d* evaluates to *true*] (a+1)+b < d evaluates to **true**

(a + 1) + b < d evaluates to **false**] (a+1)+b < d evaluates to **false**

[(a+1)+b < d evaluates to false]

Fixing m2: Splitting Events





ML_out_2 ML_out_1 when when $ml_tl = green$ $ml_{-}tl = green$ a + b + 1 = d $a + b + 1 \neq d$ a:= a + 1 41-04 then then a := a + 1 $ml_{-}tl := red$ end end

IL_out_1 when $iI_{-}tI = green$ $b \neq 1$ then b := b - 1c := c + 1end as soon as reached ? the capacity is reached? the red

then b := b - 1c := c + 1 $il_tl := red$ end

 $iI_{t} = green$

IL_out_2

when


b = 1

IL-out

Current m2 May Livelock interleging

ML_tl_green when $ml_{-}tl = red$ a+b < dc = 0then $ml_{-}tl := green$ $il_{-}tl := red$ end

IL_tl_green when $il_{t} = red$ b > 0a = 0then $il_{-}tl := green$ $ml_t tl := red$ end



The current wiz diverges

if there's

starting of the party of now around

of now around

ML_tl_green , IL_tl_green ,...)


(init	, ML_tl_green ,	ML_out_1	, <u>IL_in</u>
d = 2	d=2	d = 2	d = 2
a'=0 $b'=0$	a'=0 b'=0	a'=1 b'=0	a'=0 $b'=1$
$c' = 0$ $ml_{-}tl = red$	$c' = 0$ $ml_t l' = green$	c' = 0 $ml_{-}tl' = green$	c' = 0 $mI_{-}tI' = green$
$il_{-}tl = red$	$iI_{-}tI' = red$	$iI_{-}tI' = red$	$iI_{-}tI' = red$

d = 2d = 2d = 2a'=0a'=0a'=0b' = 1b' = 1b' = 1c'=0C' = 0c' = 0 $ml_{-}tl' = red$ $ml_{-}tl' = green$ $ml_{-}tl' = red$

 $iI_{-}tI' = red$


IL_tl_green ,

 $iI_{t}I' = green$



Fixing m2: Regulating Traffic Light Changes

Divergence Trace: <init, ML_tl_green, ML_out_1, IL_in, IL_tl_green, ML_tl_green, IL_tl_green, ...>



Fixing m2: Measuring Traffic Light Changes

```
ML_tl_green

when

ml_tl = red

a + b < d

c = 0

il_pass = 1

then

ml_tl := green

il_tl := red

ml_pass := 0

end
```

```
IL_tl_green

when

il_tl = red

b > 0

a = 0

ml_pass = 1

then


il_tl := green

ml_tl := red

il_pass := 0

end
```

			_
d = 2	ml_pass	il_pass	
< init,	1	1 2	
ML_tl_green,	0	1 7	
ML_out_1,	1	1 2	1
ML_out_2,	1	1 2	1
IL_in,	1	1 2	1
IL_in,	1	1 2	1
IL_tl_green,	1	0 7	
IL_out_1,	1	1 2	
IL_out_2,	1	1 2	1
ML_in,	1	1 2	
ML_in	1	1 2	1
>			1



PO of Convergence/Non-Divergence/Livelock Freedom

A New Event Occurrence Decreases Variant

```
A(c)
I(c, v)
J(c, v, w)
H(c, w)
\downarrow
V(c, F(c, w)) < V(c, w)

VAR
```


```
ML_tl_green
when
ml_tl = red
a + b < d
c = 0
il_pass = 1
then
ml_tl := green
il_tl := red
ml_pass := 0
end
```

Variants: ml_pass + il_pass

ML_tl_green/VAR

```
d > 0
d \in \mathbb{N}
COLOUR = {green, red}
                                               areen + red
n \in \mathbb{N}
                                               n < d
                                                                                       c \in \mathbb{N}
a \in \mathbb{N}
                                               b \in \mathbb{N}
a+b+c=n
                                               a = 0 \lor c = 0
ml_tl ∈ COLOUR
                                              il_tl ∈ COLOUR
ml_{-}tl = qreen \Rightarrow a + b < d \land c = 0
                                              iI_{-}tI = qreen \Rightarrow b > 0 \land a = 0
ml \ tl = red \lor il \ tl = red
ml_pass ∈ {0, 1}
                                              il_pass ∈ {0, 1}
                                               il_{t} = red \Rightarrow il_{pass} = 1
ml\_tl = red \Rightarrow ml\_pass = 1
ml_t tl = red
il_pass = 1
       pass 🕽 ml_pass + il_pass
```

PO of Relative Deadlock Freedom



Discharging POs of m2: Relative Deadlock Freedom

```
d \in \mathbb{N}
d > 0
COLOUR = { areen, red}
areen + red
n \in \mathbb{N}
n < d
a \in \mathbb{N}
b \in \mathbb{N}
c \in \mathbb{N}
a+b+c=n
a = 0 \lor c = 0
ml tl ∈ COLOUR
il tl ∈ COLOUR
ml_{-}tl = areen \Rightarrow a + b < d \land c = 0
iI_{-}tI = areen \Rightarrow b > 0 \land a = 0
ml_tl = red \lor il_tl = red
ml_pass ∈ {0,1}
il_pass ∈ {0, 1}
ml_tl = red \Rightarrow ml_pass = 1
il_{-}tl = red \Rightarrow il_{-}pass = 1
     a+b < d \land c = 0
 \vee c > 0
 \vee a > 0
 \vee b > 0 \land a = 0
     mI_{-}tI = red \land a + b < d \land c = 0 \land iI_{-}pass = 1
 \vee il_tl = red \wedge b > 0 \wedge a = 0 \wedge ml_pass = 1
  v ml_tl = areen

∨ il_tl = areen

 \vee a > 0
 \vee c > 0
                                                                        Study IS#2
                      15# l
d \in \mathbb{N}
                                                     d \in \mathbb{N}
                                                                                                                 IS#3
                                                                                                                                                                                              d > 0
                                                     d > 0
d > 0
                                                                                                                                                                                             b > 0 | HYP
                                                                                                                                                                 b > 0
                                                                                                                                                                                   OR_R2
b \in \mathbb{N}
                                                     b \in \mathbb{N}
ml tl = red
                                                     ml tl = red
                                                                                                           d > 0
                                                                                                                                   d > 0
                                                                                                                                                                 b < d \lor b > 0
                                                                                                                                                                                              b > 0
                                                                                                                                  b > 0 \lor b = 0 ORL
il tl = red
                                                     il tl = red
                                                                                                           b \in \mathbb{N}
ml_tl = red \Rightarrow ml_pass = 1
                                                     ml_pass = 1
                                                                                                                                                                 d > 0
                                                                                                                                                                                                        d > 0
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    d > 0
il_tl = red \Rightarrow il_pass = 1
                                                      il_pass = 1
                                                                                                           b < d \lor b > 0
                                                                                                                                   b < d \lor b > 0
                                                                                                                                                                 b = 0
                                                                                                                                                                                    EQ_LR. MON
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          OR_R1
```

 $b < d \lor b > 0$

 $0 < d \lor 0 > 0$

0 < d


 $b < d \land ml_pass = 1 \land il_pass = 1$

 $\lor b > 0 \land ml_pass = 1 \land il_pass = 1$

 $b < d \land ml_pass = 1 \land il_pass = 1$

 $\lor b > 0 \land ml_pass = 1 \land il_pass = 1$

1st Refinement and 2nd Refinement: Provably Correct





Correctness Criteria:

- + Guard Strengthening
- + Invariant Establishment
- + Invariant Preservation
- + Convergence
- + Relative Deadlock Freedom


il_tl = green

b := b - 1

c := c + 1

 $il_pass := 1$

 $b \pm 1$



ML_tl_green when ml tl = reda+b< dc = 0 $il_pass = 1$ then $ml_{-}tl := green$ $il_tl := red$ $ml_pass := 0$ end IL_tl_areen when

end

ML_out_2 when $ml_{-}tl = areen$ $il\ tl = red$ a + b + 1 = dh > 0then a = 0a := a + 1ml pass = 1ml tl := redthen $ml_pass := 1$ il tl := areen end $ml_{-}tl := red$ $il_pass := 0$

IL_out_1 ML out 1 when when $ml_t tl = areen$ $a + b + 1 \pm d$ then then a := a + 1 $ml_pass := 1$ end end

> IL_out_2 when $iI_{-}tI = areen$ b = 1then b := b - 1c := c + 1 $il\ tl := red$ $il_pass := 1$

> > end

IL_in when 2>0 then a := a - 1b := b + 1end

ML_in

when

then

end

0 > 0

c := c - 1

Lecture 24 - Dec 2


Background

Safety-Critical vs. Missional-Critical Professional Engineers: Code of Ethics Safety Property/Invariant Verification vs. Validation

Announcements/Reminders

- Today's class: notes template posted
- Lab4 released
- A reference paper for the tabular method (Lab4)
- Review session survey active now!
- Exam guide, example questions released

mathematical discrefe C. Compater math XE {(1,1).163 system discreft € 11:53. 0,1) theorem proving mandal ENVANTANTO) (tool does model checker system de checking



Acceptance Criteria Reg. precise Ly no ambignities, no contradiction El P L, complete

Indementations Conforms to Regurement UNAMBIGUOUS Requirements Implementation Souson value < nuclear plant tronslate/ formatize eg javatant entails.

Mission-Critical vs. Safety-Critical

Safety critical

When defining safety critical it is beneficial to look at the definition of each word independently. Safety typically refers to being free from danger, injury, or loss. In the commercial and military industries this applies most directly to human life. Critical refers to a task that must be successfully completed to ensure that a larger, more complex operation succeeds. Failure to complete this task compromises the integrity of the entire operation. Therefore a safety-critical application for an RTOS implies that execution failure or faulty execution by the operating system could result in injury or loss of human life.

Safety-critical systems demand software that has been developed using a well-defined, mature software development process focused on producing quality software. For this very reason the DO-178B specification was created. DO-178B defines the guidelines for development of aviation software in the USA. Developed by the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA), the DO-178B standard is a set of guidelines for the production of software for airborne systems. There are multiple criticality levels for this software (A, B, C, D, and E).

These levels correspond to the consequences of a software failure:

- Level A is catastrophic
- Level B is hazardous/severe
- Levei C is major
- Level D is minor
- Level E is no effect

Safety-critical software is typically DO-178B level A or B. At these higher levels of software criticality the software objectives defined by DO-178B must be reviewed by an independent party and undergo more rigorous testing. Typical safety-critical applications include both military and commercial flight, and engine controls.

Mission critical

A mission refers to an operation or task that is assigned by a higher authority. Therefore a mission-critical application for an RTOS implies that a failure by the operating system will prevent a task or operation from being performed, possibly preventing successful completion of the operation as a whole.

Mission-critical systems must also be developed using well-defined, mature

software development processes. Therefore they also are subjected to the rigors of DO-178B. However, unlike safety-critical applications, mission-critical software is typically DO-178B level C or D. Mission-critical systems only need to meet the lower criticality levels set forth by the DO-178B specification.

Generally mission-critical applications include <u>navigation systems</u>, <u>avionics</u> <u>display systems</u>, and <u>mission command</u> <u>and control</u>.

Source: http://pdf.cloud.opensystemsmedia.com/advancedtca-systems.com/SBS.Jan04.pdf

MCS MCS VS. (1) X SCS (=> MCS dex SCS => MCS (3) × M(S => S(S SCS C) MCS


Safety Roperty / Invariant Ly Every possible state of the system should satisfy it.

Ly If there's at least one state where the Tinu. does not hold, it is not satisfied.


Veritication: Are we building the product vight?

Process
of anstruction Nationation: Are we building the right product? are the reg.


Building the product right?



Building the right product?



Certifying Systems: Assurance Cases



Source: https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/asset_files/whitepaper/2009_019_001_29066.pdf

Exam Info

- q. booklet (sketch)
 ms. booklet (no sketch)
- When: 9am to 12pm, Thursday, December 11 (ACW 206)
- Coverage: Everything (lecture materials & labs)
 - + slides, iPad notes
- Even problems that look challenging at first are built on the <u>same foundational</u> techniques you've learned and practiced in <u>lectures</u> and <u>labs</u>. A <u>solid</u>, <u>reflective</u> grasp of the basics will take you <u>farther</u> than memorizing examples.
- Format: Mostly Written
 - + explanations/justifications + write math expressions + calculations, proofs
- Restrictions: had write
 - + One-sided computer-typed, min 10pt data sheet
 - + No sketch paper (Exam booklet includes it) + No calculator
- What you should bring:
 - + Valid, Physical Photo ID (strict)
 - + Water/Snack

I hope you enjoyed leaving with me of